In a new book entitled, Dead Certain, Bush attempted to absolve himself of responsibility for dismantling the Iraqi Military after the 2003 invasion of Iraq — a mistake “widely regarded” to have “stoked rebellion among hundreds of thousands of former Iraqi soldiers.” Bush is quoted “as saying that U.S. policy [in 2003] had been ‘to keep the army intact‘ but that it ‘didn’t happen.’ Bush said further that he “can’t remember” how he reacted to the decision to disband the Army, but added, “I’m sure I said, ‘This is the policy, what happened?’”
Subsequently, former head of the Provisional Authority in Iraq, L. Paul Bremer released an exchange of letters to the New York Times proving Bush had been informed and signed off on his intention to disband the Iraqi military.
Today, in an op-ed in the New York Times entitled, “How I Didn’t Dismantle Iraq’s Army,” Bremer goes further. He attempts to absolve himself — as the senior-most civilian leader in Iraq at the time — of nearly all responsibility for the disbanding of the Iraqi Army. Instead, he blames the Defense Department, the State Department and, most ironically, the other post-war Iraq calamity: widespread, unchecked looting. He writes, “to recall the former army was a practical impossibility because postwar looting had destroyed all the bases.”
Previously, Bremer blamed the “horrid” post-war looting on low troop levels. While in Iraq, however, Bremer repeatedly affirmed that troop levels were “adequate” enough to provide needed security.
And while Bremer attempts to shirk responsibility for the part he played in failing to stabilize post-war Iraq, former Secretary of State Madeline Albright looks for solutions. She argues in the Washington Post that the U.S. must stop pointing fingers and finally admit that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was misguided and ill-concieved:
The president is beseeching us to fear failure, but he has yet to explain how our military can succeed given Iraq’s tangled politics and his administration’s lack of credibility. …
President Bush could do his part by admitting what the world knows — that many prewar criticisms of the invasion were on target. Such an admission would be just the shock a serious diplomatic project would need. …
A coordinated international effort could help Iraq by patrolling borders, aiding reconstruction, further training its army and police, and strengthening legislative and judicial institutions. It could also send a unified message to Iraq’s sectarian leaders that a political power-sharing arrangement that recognizes majority rule and protects minority rights is the only solution and is also attainable.
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